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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABE'TH B. ARCHER, 
Plaintiff aud Appellant, 
vs. 
lJT ..\H ~'r.:\T 11: L:\XD BOARD, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9990 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLAN~T 
~T.A.Tr:~tl~~~T OF THE KIND OF CAS·E 
Thi~ is an action in the nature of mandamus to 
co1npel the lTtah State Land Board to issue an oil and 
gas lt~ast) to plaintiff and to adjudicate the conflicting 
rig-ht~ of plaintiff and defendants. 
DI~Pl)SlTIOX IN LOWER COURT· 
On motion of certain designated defendants, the 
Court dis1nissed plaintiff's amended complaint with 
prejudice. 
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RELIEF S,OUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the lower Court's order 
dismissing her co1nplaint, with prejudice. 
S:TATEl\iENT OF F AC1TS 
On .Jlay 6, 1963, plaintiff filed her co1nplaint 
against some 90 defendants, as listed in the caption 
thereof. (R. 1-2) The large majority of the defendants 
filed answers thereto. However, 1notions to dismiss said 
complaint were filed by defendants and respondents, 
LTtah State Land Board and the individual members 
thereof, and by defendants and respondents, Gulf Oil 
Corporation, Southern Natural Gas Company, Sinclair 
Oil & Gas Company, J. Murray Ruby, aka James ~1. 
Ruby, Ulenna Ruby, Glen M. Ruby, and Helen Ruby. On 
July 16, 1963, the Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint 
as to the above-named defendants and respondents only. 
Pursuant to motion and after having obtained leave 
of Court, plaintiff filed her amended co1nplaint on Aug-
ust 5, 1963. 
On August 19, the Court granted the above-named 
defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended com-
plaint. Pursuant to plaintiff's motion, the Court, on Sep-
tember 5, 1963, amended its order of August 19, 1963, 
and dis1nissed plaintiff's amended complaint as to the 
above-na1ned defendants and respondents on the grounds 
that said amended complaint fails to state a claim upon 
w·hich relief can be granted and on the further grounds 
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3 
that the Court is \rithout jurisdiction of the subject 
rnatter therein contained. 
Plaintiff's atnended complaint sets forth four causes 
of netion all rl)lating to an application for an oil and 
gas lPa~P filed by plaintiff covering all of Section 16, 
Township 26 South, Range 20 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
containing (i-10 arrPs, situate in Grand County, State of 
Utah. 
In hPr first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that a 
prior lease issued on the above-mentioned property on 
.l unP 5, 1947 for a term of ten years, expired on June 
5, 1957, notwithstanding the issuance of a substitute oil 
and gas lease on January 2, 1952 purporting to extend 
the original lease for an additional ten years from 
Jan nary 2, 1952. 
Plaintiff alleges that the attempted extension in 
1952 by the Utah State Land Board was unauthorized, 
in excesse of its powers, ultra vires, unlawful, and 
('ontrary to the laws of the State of Utah and the Rules 
nnd R.egulations of the Land Board and was, therefore, 
a nullity. Plaintiff alleges that on February 26, 196·2, she 
filed a properly executed application for an oil and gas 
lt\a~P of mineral land with the Utah State Land Board 
<'overing the above named property, depositing the re-
quired rental, and subject to the usual royalty interest 
reserved to the state, and that on March 2, 1962, she filed 
a properly executed supplemental application for an oil 
and gas lease on the same land. 
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Plaintiff alleges that at the time of filing said appli-
cations, the above-rnentioned property was not covered 
by any valid or existing lease and was open to lease by 
plaintiff, and she alleges that she ,, ... as and is a duly 
qualified applicant in accordance with the requirements 
of the laws of the State of Utah and the Rules and Regu-
lations of the Land Board. Plaintiff alleges in her first 
cause of action, as in the other three causes of action, 
that the Land Board had continually evidenced its intent 
that the land involved be available for leasing to the 
public and to duly qualified applicants and that said 
land had never been withdrawn from leasing to the pub-
lic. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendant Land 
Board is required by the statutes of the State of Utah and 
by its own Rules and Regulations to issue an oil and gas 
lease to the first qualified applicant. Plaintiff alleges a 
demand made upon the Land Board for issuance of the 
lease and a refusal by the Land Board, alleging that 
such refusal was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, 
unlawful, in excess of its jurisdiction, and a violation of 
jts duty as imposed by law. 
In her second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that 
even if the attempted extension on January 2, 1952 was 
effective, that it expired on January 31, 1962 and that 
no extensions, by partial assignment or otherwise, have 
been effected. 
Plaintiff again alleges the filing of her applications, 
the fact that she was a duly qualified applicant, that the 
land 'vas open to the public for applications for oil and 
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ga~ h'U~PH, that ~ub~equent to the filing of her applica-
tion~ and prior to ~larch 28, 1962, the defendant Land 
Hoard sought an opinion frotn the Attorney General of 
tlu· ~tate of Utah as to whether or not it could legally 
grunt a lt'use to plaintiff pursuant to her applications, 
and that on ~larch 28, 1962, the Attorney General ad-
vis(ld the Land Board that there was no partial assign-
IIH'nt of the prior lease on record, that the primary lease 
had Pxpired, and that there was no legal bar to the 
i~~uaneP of a lease to plaintiff pursuant to her appli-
cations. 
Plaintiff again alleges the mandatory requirement 
upon the State Land Board to issue leases to the first 
qualified applicant and alleges its failure to follow such 
n1andate, and further alleges that such failure is arbi-
trary, capricious, discriminatory, unlawful, in excess of 
its jurisdiction, and a willful failure to carry out the 
duties imposed upon it by law. 
In her third cause of action, plaintiff incorporates 
the pertinent paragraphs of her first and second causes 
of a<~t ion and alleges that certain of the defendants there-
in nruned claim an interest in the subject property by 
reason of a purported partial assignment which was not 
ntade during the primary term of the lease under which 
~aid defendants claim, or any extension thereof, and 
plaintiff alleges that said assignment is null and void 
and the defendants claiming thereunder have no interest 
in the property involved. 
The fourth cause of action alleges that the land 
involved was committed to a unit agreement in June of 
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1962 subsequent to plaintiff's filing and alleges that the 
balance of the defendants in the action claim an interest 
by reason of said unit agreement, and plaintiff further 
alleges that all of said interests so claimed are null and 
void. 
The j udgn1ent of the lo\ver Court dismissing plain-
tiff's an1ended complaint, applies only to defendants Gulf 
Oil Corporation, Southern Natural Gas Company, Sin-
clair Oil & Gas Con1pany, J. l\Iurray Ruby, aka James 
i\L Ruby, Glenna Ruby, Glen l\I. Ruby, Helen Ruby, Utah 
State Land Board, and its respPetive members. All other 
defendants have ans,vered the a1nended co1nplaint or 
appropriate defaults have been taken. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES STATE A 
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED 
·The defendants and respondents who are parties to 
this appeal have, during the course of the motions pre-
sented to the lo,ver Court, raised a great number of 
objections to plaintiff's original complaint and her 
a1nended cornplaint. The Court, in none of its orders, 
indicated the grounds upon \vhich dismissal was ordered 
until the order of September 5, "~hen at the request of 
plaintiff's counsel, the Court gave as its grounds for 
dis1nissal ''that said amended complaint fails to state a 
clairn upon \Vhich relief can be granted and on the further 
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grounds that tlH' Court is without jurisdiction of the 
~ubjl~et tnatter therPin eontained." (R. 219) 
It i~ intPrtlsting to note that in their attack against 
plaintiff's original complaint, defendants cited several 
FPderal eases, runong them, Haley ,r~. Seaton, 281 Fed. 
:!d 620 (D. C. Cir. 1960), to the effect that under Federal 
law, the ~l'<~retary of the IntPrior need not issue a lease 
to the first qualified applicant if he has made a determi-
nation that tla· land shall not be available to lease by 
anyone. (R. 72, 92) In fact, the Attorney General, in one 
of his briPfs presented to the lower Court, stated: 
HIt 1nay \veil be that if the Land Board had 
made a determination that the subject lands were 
available for leasing to the public at large, the 
plaintiff may have a claim for relief if preference 
\\·PrP giYen to another applicant over the plaintiff, 
... '' (R. 93) 
:\nd again he stated : 
"There is no allegation to the effect that the 
State Land Board in any 'vay determined that the 
~nbject lands were open to the public at large for 
leasing." (R. 92) 
.And again: 
··J t is submitted that 'vhat the Legislature had 
in mind \Vas that 65-1-14, U.C.A. 1953 gave the ~and Board 'discretion' whether to accePt applica-
tions or not to accept applications to lease land 
as they determine the interests of the State and 
continuity and fair development of the State's 
mineral resources 'varrant. Having detennined 
to lease or accept applications, it would then be 
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required to accept applications in the order for 
which leases are applied. This would 1nean that 
there would be no vested right merely upon filing 
an application, but a right would not accrue until 
the Land Board determined that it was in the best 
interests of the State to lease the land in ques-
tion." (R. 79) (Emphasis Added) 
The allegation that such a deterrnination has been 
1nade is found in plaintiff's amended complaint in each of 
the four causes of action. See paragraph 8 (R. 125). 
Plaintiff has alleged that at the time of filing her 
application, there was no lease covering the subject pro-
perty and that it was open to leasing by the public and 
that plaintiff was a duly qualified applicant possessing 
all of the qualifications required by statute and by the 
Rules and Regulations of the Land Board, and that she 
\Vas the first such qualified applicant to file upon this 
open land. She further alleges that the Land Board had 
1nade its determination that the land be available to 
leasing by the public. She alleges that, as a matter of 
law, the Land Board is under an absolute duty to issue 
a lease to such first qualified applicant pursuant to the 
provisions of 65-1-88, U.C.A., 19·53, which provides in 
part: 
"Except as otherwise provided by Section 
65-1-45 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by 
this act, oil and gas leases in units not exceeding 
640 acres or one section, whichever is larger, shall 
be issued to the applicant first applying for the 
lease "rho is qualified to hold a lease under this 
act .... " (Emphasis added) 
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:-;P<·tion 65-1-45 tnentioned in the preePding section is 
not applicable to the fact situation here presented inas-
nntch as that section specifically refers to the procedure 
to ht• followed in the PYPnt a previous tnineral lease is 
ca net' /led or otherwise te-r-rni nated and does not apply to 
a ~ituntion "'here a prior lease has expired as is the case 
hPI"t'. 
[n thP recent caHP of Baur vs. Pacific Finance Cor-
poration (July 1963) 14 lTtah 2d 283, 383 p·. 2d 397, this 
Court in revl•rsing the lower Court's order dismissing a 
co1nplaint stated: 
HAs 've have heretofore declared, the grant-
ing of a motion to dismiss, which deprives the 
party of the privilege of presenting his evidence, 
is a harsh measure 'vhich Courts should grant 
only 'vhen it clearly appears that taking the view 
tnost favorable to the complaint and any facts 
'vhich n1ight properly be proved thereunder, no 
right to redress could be established; and unless 
it so clearly appears, doubt should be resolved 
in favor of allo,ving him the opportunity to pre-
sent his proof.~' 
St.•P also Sa nuns rs. Eccles, 11 lTtah 2d 289, 358 P. 2d 344. 
Plaintiff submits that defendants have at no time 
during this proceeding raised any objection to the 
amended complaint which could sustain the Court's order 
of dismissal. They have, ho,vever, on occasion raised the 
question of sovereign immunity regarding the Land 
Board, that the Land Board has discretion to issue a 
lease to any applicant under Section 65-1-88, and that 
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1nandan1us is not the proper remedy in this situation. 
These three points \vill be treated separately. 
Point 2. 
THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 65-1-88, U. C. A., 1953 
IS MANDATORY 
Respondents contend that the Land Board has dis-
cretion whether or not to issue a lease to plaintiff under 
the circumstances alleged in her complaint. To support 
that contention, they cite Section 65-1-14, U.C.A., 1953 
which section covers the general powers of the Land 
Board. That section is not applicable to the specific fact 
situation here presented. 
That specific provisions of a statute take preference 
over general statutory provisions is an ele1nentary rule 
of statutory construction. See B atentan vs. Board of 
Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P. 2d 381, and Pacific 
Intermountain Express Co. vs. State Tax Commission, 
7 l~ tah 2d 15, 316 P. 2d 549. That rule must prevail here. 
\\..-e cannot look to the language conferring the general 
powers upon the board in Section 65-1-14 but must look 
to the specific statute conferring power upon the board 
to issue oil and gas leases. Section 65-1-88, lT.C.A., 1953, 
provides that oil and gas leases shall be issued to the 
first qualified applicant applying therefore. Plaintiff 
has alleged that she is a qualified applicant, that the 
land 'vas open for lease at the ti1ne her application was 
filed, and that the Land Board had deter1nined to make 
the land available to the public for such leasing. These 
allegations, of course, must be treated as fact. 
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Thi~ Court, in the case of Deseret Savings Bank vs. 
Francis, 62 l ~tah S5, 217 P. 1114, held that the use of the 
word "shall'' in a statute imposes a mandatory duty. 
'rhP Court there stated: 
··'rhl' words of the statute are imperative and 
n1andatory, and while the mere form of a statute 
d<H ,~ not control in this respect the presumption 
i~ that the \vords are used in their ordinary sense, 
and if a different interpretation is sought it must 
rest upon so1nething in the character of the legis-
lation or in the context which will justify a differ-
ent Ineaning." 
Thi8 Court, in that case, 'vent even further and stated 
that when a po,ver is given by statute to public officers, 
in perini~siy·e language, the language used will be re-
garded as pere1nptory where the public interest or indi-
vidual rights require such a construction. See also State 
rs. Zehner, 1.0 c·tah 2d 45, 347 P. 2d 111. 
There is nothing whatever in the purpose or policy 
of the legislation under consideration which would re-
ttuire a different construction. The po,ver given the Land 
Boa.rd is not for its benefit but for the benefit of the 
public. The Legislature ha~ carefully prescribed the 
ttualifications 'vhich an applicant must possess in order 
to fall within the class of qualified applicants. See Sec-
tion 65-1-87. litah Code Annotated, 1953. To construe the 
\Vor, l ·•shall'' as giving the Land Board a discretionary 
po\ver rather than prescribing a n1andatory duty, would 
not only ignore the plain language or the statute but 
'vould completely thwart the purpose of the legislation 
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and would enable the Land Board to select at rando1n 
whichever applicant it might favor at the moment and 
discriininate against all others. \r e sub1nit that had the 
Legislature atte1npted to give such a discretionary power, 
it \vould have been an unconstitutional delegation. 
The Land Board, itself, has so construed its obliga-
tion as far as the issuance of oil and gas leases are con-
cerned. Section 65-1-97, U.C.A., 1953, gives the Land 
Board the power to make and enforce Rules and Regula-
tions not inconsistent with statutory provisions. Pur-
suant to that authority the Land Board has historically 
issued Rules and Regulations governing the issuance of 
Inineral leases including oil and gas lea:se:s. The official 
Rules and Regulations in effect at the tune plaintiff filed 
her application, as they 'vere an1ended on January 10, 
196·2, provided: 
"Except as otherwise provided in these Rules 
and Regulations, the land board shall grant a 
lease to a qualified applicant whose application is 
first filed provided that the rental and the royalty 
offered is acceptable to the board." (Rule 2(a) 
(6) (b)) (Emphasis added) 
Those rules further provide that Section 65-1-45 
covering simultaneous filing on newly acquired lands or 
those on "~hieh a previous mineral lease has been can-
celled or other\\rise terininated, do not apply to lands 
covered by oil and gas leases \Yhich expire. Rule 7 (d) 
provides: 
~'Lands covered by oil and gas leases which 
Pxpire are not subject· to the posting of notice or 
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to the period for simultaneous filing specified. in 
Rule 7 (a). S1tch lands shall be opened t.o le.astng 
by tltc first qualifed applicant u_pon exptratton of 
the existing lease, .•. " (Emphasis added) 
Thus it is seen that the Land Board, by its own rules, 
i~~ued pursuant to statutory authority, has reiterated the 
ntnndate i1nposed upon it by the Legislature. 
'.l'he Land Board has wrongfully refused to follow 
thP legi~lative tnandate, and such refusal is, as alleged 
in plaintiff's complaint, arbitrary, capricious, discrimi-
natory, unla,vful, in excess of its jurisdiction and a viola-
tion of its duty as imposed by law. 
Point 3. 
THE LOWER COURT DOES HAVE JURISDICTION 
Respondents apparently rely upon the recent case of 
JlcKnight l'S. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P. 
:2d 7:!ti, for the proposition that certiorari is the exclu-
sivt' ren1edy available to plaintiff. That case does not so 
hold. It is true that this Court took jurisdiction to review 
the findings of the Land Board based upon its original 
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari as conferred by 
the Constitution, statute, and the Utah Rules of 'Civil 
Procedure. However, the fact that the S·upreme Court 
can rPview·, by writ of certiorari, a decision of the Land 
Board given pursuant to a formal hearing does not pre-
elude the remedy of mandamus as sought by plaintiff in 
this case. 
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We have no quarrel with the general rule that an 
action in the nature of mandamus will not lie if another 
remedy exists which is plain, speedy, complete and fully 
adequate. However, the fact that this Court has enter-
tained a controversy from the ~Land Board under its 
original jurisdiction to issue 'vrits of certiorari, does not 
mean that certiorari affords a plain, adequate, and 
speedy remedy to this plaintiff or that it is even available 
to her under the circumstances of this case. In discussing 
the type of remedy which would preclude the availability 
of mandamus, the following language in 34 Am. Jur., 
Mandamus, Section 44 is pertinent: 
"It cannot be said to be fully adequate unless 
it is commensurate with the necessities and rights 
of the complaining party, under all the circum-
stances of the case, reaches the end intended, and 
actually compels performance of the duty in ques-
tion. Furthermore, the remedy which will pre-
clude mandamus must be equally as convenient, 
complete, beneficial, and effective as would be 
mandamus, and be sufficiently speedy to prevent 
n1aterial injury. Another remedy, tedious and not 
so well adapted to the nature of the case as that 
by mandamus, will not operate to prevent resort 
to the latter remedy.'' (Emphasis Added) 
Jurisdiction to hear this case is conferred upon the 
District 'Court by the Constitution and by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Article VIII, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution pro-
vides: 
"The District Court shall have original juris-
diction in all matters civil and criminal, not ex-
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cepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by 
law; 
• • • 
urrhP District Courts or any judge ,thereof 
shall have power to issue writs of habeas c?rpu~, 
1na ndamus, injunction, quo warranto, cert~orar~, 
hib•t• " pro 1 1on ... 
Rule 65B(b) (3) likewise confers jurisdiction upon 
the District Court. 
Actually, plaintiff has no other remedy whatever. 
A hearing befor(:l the Land Board would he futile inas-
tnuch as the Land Board is powerless to adjudicate the 
rights of the n1any defendants claiming an interest in the 
subject property adverse to plaintiff. 
In the case of State vs. Walker (New Mexico, 1956) 
:.!9:! P. :!d 329, the Supreme ,Court of New Mexico con-
~idered a case virtually identical with the case being here 
con8idered. The plaintiff in that case tendered certain 
lodP tnining location notices to the New Mexico Commis-
~ionPr of Publie Land. The Commissioner failed to issue 
hint a pPrtnit in accordance with the mandate of the sta-
tute and hP brought a mandamus proceeding in the Dis-
trirt Court. The trial court quashed the alternative writ 
on the single ground that the Commissioner was an 
tlXecuti YP officer exercising a discretionary function and, 
therefore, the Court was without jurisdiction and with-
out authority to grant the requested relief. 
The pertinent portion of the New Mexico Statute 
(Section 7-9-4, 1953 Compilation) provided that: 
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"Upon filing of such copy, the commissioners 
shall issue a permit to the locator granting him 
the exclusive right to prospect for ores or metals 
within the limits of said location ... " (Emphasis 
Added) 
The S·upreme Court, in reversing the trial court, 
stated: 
"It is established la'v that the purpose of 
1nandamus is to compel the performance of a 
ministerial duty which one charged with its per-
formance has refused to perform. 
"While mandamus will not lie to correct or 
control the judgment or discretion of a public 
officer in matters cormnitted to his care in the 
ordinary discharge of his duties, it is neverthe-
less well established that mandamus will lie to 
compel the performance of mere ministerial acts 
or duties imposed by law upon a public officer to 
do a particular act or thing upon the existence of 
certain facts or conditions being shown, even 
though the officer be required but to exercise 
judgment before acting, (citing cases). A mini-
sterial act, as applied to a public officer, is an act 
or thing which he is required to perform by direc-
tion of law upon a given state of facts being shown 
to exist, regardless of his own opinion as to the 
propriety or impropriety of doing the act in a 
particular case . . . 
,. In accordance with the letter and spirit of 
Section '7 -9-4 supra, the respondent is bound _to 
perform his duty in respect to accepting lode min-
ing location notice tendered to him by locators, 
who have complied with the terms of the statute, 
for filing in his office, 
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• • • 
··t n the ea~e at bar the respondent was ten-
derPd eopiP~ of lode mining locatio~! notices by 
thP rPlator which clearly and unequivocally met 
all n~quireTnents of the statute, and ~he accepting 
of thP satne for filing in the land off1ce was rnan-
datory and unqualified. 
• • • 
"ThPrefore, upon formal tender of lode min-
ing location notices being made, it wast~~ duty of 
the rospondent to accPpt the same for f1hng pur-
pos('~, for thP statute simply imposes upon the 
respondent a tninistPrial duty in \vhich he had no 
discretion. 
··As our conclusion is that the judgment of 
the trial court must be reversed, it becomes un-
ne::;sary to detertnnie the remaining questions pre-
sentPd in this appeal." 
In the case of Hta.tc vs. State Highway Patrol (Mon-
tana, 195~) ~t~l P. ~cl 612, the l\iontana Supreme Court 
hPld that the 1nere existence of a right of appeal where 
it i~ inadequate does not preclude the issuance of a writ 
of n1andate. Of course, in the case at bar, there is no 
right of appeal from the absolute failure of respondent 
Land Board to issue a lease in accordance with the statu-
tory ntandate. Plaintiff has no remedy other than the 
one she seeks here. 
In Koehn t·s. State Board of Equalization, et al, 
(California, 1958) 333 P. 2d 125, the Court held that 
mandrunus ·w·as a proper remedy to test the action of 
the state alcoholic beverage control board even though 
certiorari was also available. The Court there stated: 
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·'Appellant then contends that the only re-
view of the Appeals Board's action can be by 
certiorari to the District Court of Appeal. It 
points to section 4b, article \'I, Constitution 
'vhich states that the District Court of Appeal 
may exercise appellate jurisdiction "in proceed-
ings of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition • • • 
and in such other special proceedings as may be 
provided by law * * * '. (Emphasis added.) It 
then argues that the Legislature, in designating 
as the powers of the Appeals Board, the appellate 
review provisions of section 1094.5, Code of Civil 
Procedure (writ of mandamus) applicable to con-
stitutional agencies (compare section 23084, Busi-
ness and Professions Code with section 1094.5, 
Code of Civil Procedure as to constitutional 
agencies) intended by implication that the review 
provided for in section 23091, Business and Pro-
fessions Code ('Final orders of the board shall 
be subject to judicial revie'v as prescribed by 
law') would fall within the above quoted pro-
vision of the Constitution giving the District 
Court of Appeal original jurisdiction in 'such 
other special proceedings as may be provided by 
law • * *'. Such an interpretation of 'judicial 
review as prescribed by law' is too narrow. 
'[L] aw' refers to section 1094.5, Code of ·Civil 
Procedure (mandamus) and sections 1067-1077, 
Code of Civil Procedure (certiorari). Both the 
District ·Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court 
have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus 
and certiorari. In the instances where the sole 
jurisdiction of certiorari from the acts of an 
administrative agency is in the appellate courts 
such exclusive jurisdiction and the necessary pro-
cedure has been set forth by the Legislature. 
Thus sections 1756 and 1759 of the Public Utilities 
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CodP, providing ePrtio rari frotn the act~ o~ t~e 
Publir lTtili tiPs Cotnmission, has placed JUrisdic-
tion PxelusivPly in the Supre1ne Court, and Labor 
Codt•, ~Prtion 5950 providing certiorari from the 
acts of the Industrial Accident Commission has 
placed jurisdietion exclusively in the District 
( 
1ourts of 1\ppeal. If, in connection with acts of 
thP Appeals Board, the Legislature intended that 
<'Prt iorari should be the Pxclusive procedure and 
t hut the District Courts of Appeal should have 
Pxrlusivt· jurisdiction, it is reasonable to assume 
that tht' J~egislature \\rould have said so, as it did 
in thP Jlublic Utilities Commission and Industrial 
.\eeident ( 10lntnission rnatters.'' 
That situation is IH'PeisPly the one here presented. 
The LPgislaturP ha~ 1nade no provision whatever in 
Title 65 dealing "·ith stat<· lands for a specific method 
of tPsting the validity of the Land Board's acts or 
otnission~. Cotnpare that \vith Section 54-7-16 U.'C.A., 
l953, \\·hieh sets forth in detail the procedure by which 
orders of the Public ~Prvice Corn1nission may be tested. 
Tlu~ language of the Koehn case is applicable here -
had the Legislature intended that certiorari be the ex-
clusivP rPIUPdy as they obviously did in the Public Utili-
ties .A.et. it i8 reasonable to assun1e that it would have 
~n provided. 
The Legislature has directed the Land Board in 
peretnptory and 1nandatory language to perform the 
tnini~terial act of is~uing a lease to the plaintiff under 
the conditions alleged in plaintiff's complaint. Such fail-
ure is arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, unlawful, in 
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excess of its jurisdiction, and a violation of its duty as 
imposed by law. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate, 
or speedy remedy and indeed has no other remedy at all 
other than the one being here pursued which can fully 
adjudicate her rights and the rights of the parties ad-
versely claiming against her. Clearly the District Court 
does have jurisdiction of this case. 
Point 4. 
THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS NOT 
AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENTS 
All of the respondents involved in this appeal have 
urged the defense of sovereign immunity. It is clear 
that such a defense, if it did exist, would be available 
only to the State Land Board. See Decorso vs. Thomas, 
89 Utah 160, 50 P. 2d 9'51, wherein the Court stated: 
"Suffice it to observe that the defense that 
the state land board may not be sued without its 
consent is for its benefit and protection, and such 
defense is not available to defendant Mohlman." 
This, again, points up the fact that no tribunal, 
other than a court of general jurisdiction, can adequately 
adjudicate the rights of the 1nany parties involved in this 
proceeding. 
We respectfully submit that the defense of sovereign 
immunity is not available to the State Land Board in 
this action. S·ee 34 Am. Jur., Mandamus, Section 123 
wherein it is stated: 
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"If the tnandamus proceeding in which the 
Htate's officers or boards are made respondents 
cannot subject the state to the payment of money 
or result in any diminution of its sovereignty, 
it is not a proce.eding against the state, as where 
all that can possibly flow from the judgment 
in numdatnus is that the public official or offi-
cial board \vill be required to refund or release 
1noncy or property wrongfully detained from the 
relator." 
Rt~spondents have cited the case of Wilkinson vs. 
State, l't al, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 in support of their 
defense of sovereign im1nunity. That case is one seeking 
to rt~cover da,mages to plaintiff's land and crops allegedly 
caused by the acts of the Land Board. The Court, in 
that case, held, and properly so, that the state is im-
tnunl~ from a claim for damages unless expressed per-
ntission is given by statute or Constitution. The ·Court 
did, ho\vever, clearly indicate that its ruling did not 
apply to actions in the nature of mandamus by the 
following language: 
"By what we have said we do not mean that 
state officers, or state boards, or state agencies 
may not, under certain circumstances, be sued 
in the courts. Such cases abound in the reports 
of this as well as other states." 
In the case of Thoreson vs. State Board of Examin-
ers, 19 Utah 18, 57 P. 175, the Court held that where a 
~tatute requires an officer to perform a ministerial act, 
he will not be permitted, in a mandamus proceeding, to 
plead, in justification of non-performance, that the act 
would violate the constitution. 
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In the case of State vs. Cutler, 34 lT tah 99, 95 P. 
1071, the Court considered a claim by a court reporter 
against the Board of Exanriners for nrileage. The plain-
tiff, in that case, proceeded by way of rnandarnus, and 
the Board of Examiners raised the defense of sovereign 
immunity. 'This Court there stated: 
"It is further urged that a writ of mandate 
should not issue against respondents for the reas-
on that in passing upon claims against the state 
they act in a quasi judicial capacity and must 
therefore be permitted to exercise the discretion 
usually exercised by such boards. That respond-
ents do act in such a capacity, and that they may 
exercise discretionary powers in the discharge of 
their official duties in passing upon and in allow-
ing or rejecting claims, does not admit of doubt. 
But this discretion is not one that may be arbi-
trarily exercised so as to prevent claimant from 
seeking redress in the courts where purely ques-
tions of law are involved. In such cases even 
courts may be compelled to proceed to judgment, 
and, where the law directs what the judgment 
shall be in case all the facts are found or ad-
mitted, a superior court may direct an inferior 
one with respect to the particular judgment that 
shall be entered by it. The povv~er to do this is 
not limited to appellate proceedings, as is illus-
trated in the case of State v. ~!l:orse, 31 Utah 213, 
87 Pac. 705. 
"In vie\v of the conceded facts, there is noth-
ing upon which the respondents can legally exer-
cise any discretionary powers in this case, and 
therefore they should have audited and allowed 
the claim. 
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·~Thore would be so1nething lacking in our 
system of government or jurisprudence if under 
such circumstances a claimant could be defeated 
simply because the officer or board requir~d to 
audit and allow his claiin exercised some discre-
tion in the matter. Where the duty to act is clear, 
nnd the Ia\\" gives a right to obtain payment of 
a <'laiin o\\·ing hy the state, courts should not 
hP~itate to enforce the right by mandamus." 
In thl' Parly case of Whit-rnore vs. Candland, 1915, 
-1-7 LTtah 7'7, 1!>1 1). 528, this Court held: 
···The whole matter of making disposition of 
the state's land was placed in the hands and 
under the control of the state land board. No 
right of appeal to the courts, or of reviewing 
the board's actions otherwise by the courts, ex-
cept where lack or excess of power is alleged, 
has been given." (Emphasis added.) 
The corollary of this rule, of course, is that if the 
board has acted \vithout or in excess of its powers or 
jurisdiction, a court may inquire into such action. Such 
allegations art' clearly made in each cause of action of 
plaintiff's con1plaint. 
In the case of Decorso vs. Thomas, supra, the State 
Land Board urged the defense of sovereign immunity 
claiming that it could not be sued without its consent. 
This Court, after referring to the case of Wilkinson vs. 
State, supra, (an action for money damages against the 
~tate) and to the case of Whitmore vs. Candland supra 
' , ("·herein the Court held that the Land Board could be 
sued if it acts \vithout or in excess of its power or 
jurisdiction), stated: 
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"When the commissioners of the state land 
board attempted to cancel the lease because of 
the failure to pay royalties, without giving the 
statutory notice, their action in such respect is 
contrary to law and in excess of their powers 
and a nullity with respect to the interests of 
the copartnership." 
We submit that this Court has consistently held 
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not available 
to an agency of the state where no money damages are 
sought and where the inquiry is to determine whether 
such agency has acted without or in excess of its powers 
or jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff has clearly stated a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. She has alleged a right on her 
part given by statute (65-1-88). She has alleged an abso-
lute and mandatory duty on the part of the defendant 
Land Board to perform the ministerial act of issuing 
a lease to her on lands which it had determined were 
open to lease to the public. She has alleged that the 
failure of the Land Board to issue a lease under these 
conditions was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, un-
lawful, and in excess of its jurisdiction, and a willful 
failure to carry out its duties as imposed by law. For 
the purpose of this appeal, those allegations must be 
treated as uncontroverted facts. Plaintiff is clearly en-
ti tied to have the District Court review the actions of 
the Land Board to determine whether or not it acted 
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lawfully and within its jurisdiction or unlawfully and 
in PX('t':-\~ ot' its jurisdiction. There is no la'v to the 
t~ontrary. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the District Court by 
thtt Constitution, by the Utah cases, and by the Utah 
Rult-~ of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff has no other plain, speedy, or adequate 
remedy to con1pel issuance of a lease to her or to have 
an adjudication of the conflicting claims of the numerous 
dt~fendants. 
Plaintiff has complied with all statutory require-
tuents and all requiren1ents of the Rules and Regulations 
of the Land Board, itself. ·The Land Board, pursuant 
to the statutory mandate and pursuant to its own Rules 
and Regulations, has nothing left to do but perform 
tlw tninisterial act of issuing a lease to her. Upon its 
failure to do so, the District Court can compel the Board 
to take such action. 
Respondents' position runounts to the proposition, 
noh,·ithstanding the mandatory language of the statute 
and the Rules and Regulations of the Land Board itself 
' ' that the Board Inay issue a lease to whomever it pleases, 
'vhenever it pleases, and under any circumstances which 
\vould satisfy its caprice. Furthermore, such acts or 
otni~~ion~, according to respondents' theory, would be 
forever shielded from judicial scrutiny by the cloak of 
sovereign immunity. There is no support in conscience, 
la'v or equity for such position. 
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Plaintiff respectfully submits that the District Court 
erred in dismissing her complaint with prejudice and 
prays that this honorable Court reverse such order and 
remand the case to the District Court for further pro-
ceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK K. BOYLE 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
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